The FIRN PhD Student Brown Bag Network Committee is hosting fortnightly Brown Bag Seminars during 2021 targeted to Finance PhD students from our member institutions. 

Each seminar* consists of an informal presentation of research at all stages, followed by a discussion and a Q&A session. This provides a great opportunity for PhD students to practice and get relevant skills for their upcoming career as well as create valuable connections with potential future colleagues. Presenters and discussants will receive certificates that accredit their contribution. The participants will also have a chance to win a $100 random prize at the end of the year.

If you would like to present your current research work or serve as a discussant, please fill out the EOI form. Additionally, registration is required for all seminar participants. Registration can be done by clicking on the link below each seminar you would like to attend. All sessions are held via zoom and a zoom link will be sent to those who register.

HDR students are also encouraged to register here to receive updates about incoming seminars and events. If you need further information, please contact the FIRN PhD Student Brown Bag Network Committee by email via

*Brown Bag Seminars are held on the second and fourth Tuesdays of every month between 11:00-12:00pm (AEST).

Upcoming Brown Bag Seminars

Tuesday 30 November, 11am (AEST)
Presenter: Sheng Huang, PhD student, University of Melbourne
Title: Creditor Control Rights and Blockholder

Abstract: This study examines how a firm’s covenant violations affect blockholders’ stakes in the firm. A firm’s control is shifted towards its creditors upon covenant violations and the heightened creditor control helps turn around the firm (Nini, Smith, & Sufi, 2012). Blockholders and creditors have diverged interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and the heightened creditor control could prevent blockholders from making meaningful changes. If blockholders want to make such changes, their stakes will be lower upon a covenant violation than what it would be without the violation. Alternatively, blockholders’ stakes will be higher at such times if they passively wait for the firm to be turned around by creditors. The present study shows that blockholders’ stakes are discretely higher upon a firm’s covenant violations. Blockholders and creditors appear to have opposing viewpoints on post-violation investment and financing policies. Blockholders’ presence in a post-violation firm is associated with a slower short-run recovery but better long-run performances of the firm.
Discussant: Yifei Miao from Monash University
Moderator: Antoine Girardeau from Curtin University
register here